Knowledge Disclosure, Patents and Optimal Organization of Research and Development

We develop a model of two-stage cumulative research and development (R&D), in which one Research Unit (RU) with an innovative idea bargains to license her nonverifiable interim knowledge exclusively to one of two competing Development Units (DUs) via one of two alternative modes: an Open sale after patenting this interim knowledge, or a Closed sale in which precluding further disclosure to a competing DU requires the RU to hold a stake in the licensed DU's post-invention revenues. Both models lead to partial leakage of RU's knowledge from it's description, to the licensed DU alone in a closed sale, and to both DUs in an open sale. We find that higher levels of interim knowledge are more likely to be licensed via closed sales. If the extent of leakage is lower, more RUs choose open sales, generating a non-monotonic relationship between the strength of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) and aggregate R&D expenditures. We also develop a rationale for the ex ante acquisition of control rights over the RU by a DU, rooted in the RU's incentives to create knowledge under alternative modes of sale thereof, and her wealth constraint in ex interim bargaining.R&D organisation, patents, intellectual property rights

Control Rights over Intellectual Property: Corporate Venturing and Bankruptcy Regimes

We develop a theory of control rights in the context of licensing interim innovative knowledge for further development, which is consistent with the inalienability of initial innovator's intellectual property rights (IPR). Control rights of a downstream development unit, a buyer of the interim innovation, arise from his ability to prevent the upstream research unit from forming financial coalitions at the ex interim stage of bargaining, over the amount and structure of licensing fees as well as the mode of licensing, either based on trade secrets or via patenting. We model explicitly the equilibrium choice of the financial structure of licensing fees and show that the innovator's financial constraint is more likely to bind when the value of her innovation is low. By constraining the flexibility of the upstream unit regarding her choice of the mode of licensing of her interim knowledge, the controlling development unit is able to reduce the research unit's payoffs in such contingencies. This incentivises the research unit to expend costly e¤ort ex ante to generate more productive interim innovations. We show that such interim control rights can be renegotiation-proof.

Patents vs Trade Secrets: Knowledge Licensing and Spillover

We develop a model of two-stage cumulative research and development (R&D), in which one Research Unit (RU) with an innovative idea bargains to license her nonverifiable interim knowledge exclusively to one of two competing Development Units (DUs) via one of two alternative modes: an Open sale after patenting this knowledge, or a Closed sale in which precluding further disclosure to a competing DU requires the RU to hold a stake in the licensed DU’s post-invention revenues. Both modes lead to partial leakage of RU’s knowledge from its description, to the licensed DU alone in a closed sale, and to both DUs in an open sale. The open sale is socially optimal; yet the contracting parties choose the closed sale whenever the interim knowledge is more valuable and leakage is sufficiently high. If the extent of leakage is lower, more RUs choose open sales, generating a non-monotonic relationship between the strength of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) and aggregate R&D expenditures and the overall likelihood of development by either DU.

Insider trading, investment and liquidity: a welfare analysis

We compare equilibrium trading outcomes with and without participation by an informed insider, assuming inflexible ex ante aggregate investment choices by agents. Noise trading arises from aggregate uncertainty regarding other agents' intertemporal consumption preferences. The welfare levels of outsiders can thus be ascertained. The allocations without insider trading are not ex ante Pareto efficient, because our model differs from standard ones with negative exponential utility functions and normal returns. We characterize the circumstances under which the revelation of payoff-relevant information via prices-arising from insider trading- benefits outsiders with stochastic liquidity needs, by improving risk-sharing among them

Bank bailout menus

Bailing out banks requires overcoming debt overhang as well as dealing with adverse selection with respect to the quality of banks' balance sheets, in terms of heterogeneity in both the likelihood and extent of their potential shortfalls, of future asset values vis-a-vis contractual debt obligations. We examine bailouts that eliminate debt overhang, while attempting to minimize subsidies to banks' equity holders. When banks do not differ with respect to the extent of debt overhang, it can be fully overcome with the minimal amount of subsidies, providing each bank's equity holders no more than their pre-bailout values, with a partial new equity injection, or an asset buyout. When levels of debt overhang covary with underlying probabilities of default, we characterize the conditions for attaining a similar minimal subsidy outcome, with a Menu of either equity injection or asset buyout plans, satisfying suitable self-selection constraints among bank types. These involve global rather than local conditions, with multiple intersections of indifference curves among types, and imply strictly greater funds injections than those needed to make existing debt default-free. We also explore the role of coupling asset purchases with providing the bailout agency Options to buy bank equity, to enhance its capture of rents arising from new investments by banks. We compare its performance with equity injections on this dimension, as well as others such as post-bailout stakes held by prior inside equity holders of banks

0 Bianchi-I kozmičkim strunama

Einstein field equations with the cosmological term are solved for an axially symmetric Bianchi-I Letelier string coupled with a magnetic field. It is shown that in the presence of Λ, the initial singularity occurs faster. A formula to obtain numerical value of Φ2 = A2/B2 is given.Rijeđena je Einsteinova jednadžba polja s kozmološkim članom za aksijalno-simetričnu Bianchi-I Letelierovu strunu vezanu za magnetsko polje. Pokazano je da se u prisustvu Λ početni singularitet brze pojavljuje

Bank Bailout Menus

We study bailouts of banks that suffer from debt overhang problems and have private information about the quality of their assets-in-place and new investment opportunities. Menus of bailout plans are used as a screening device. Constrained optimality involves overcapitalization and nonlinear pricing, with worse types choosing larger bailouts. When investment opportunities follow the assets, we derive an equivalence result between equity injections and asset buyouts. The larger capital outlay under asset buyouts can be offset by borrowing against the assets. If investment opportunities follow the bank, equity injections offer more upside to the bailout agency. This may reduce or enhance efficiency, depending on whether screening intensity is needed mostly on assets-in-place or new investments. (JEL G28, G01, D82

0 Bianchi-I kozmičkim strunama

Einstein field equations with the cosmological term are solved for an axially symmetric Bianchi-I Letelier string coupled with a magnetic field. It is shown that in the presence of Λ, the initial singularity occurs faster. A formula to obtain numerical value of Φ2 = A2/B2 is given.Rijeđena je Einsteinova jednadžba polja s kozmološkim članom za aksijalno-simetričnu Bianchi-I Letelierovu strunu vezanu za magnetsko polje. Pokazano je da se u prisustvu Λ početni singularitet brze pojavljuje

Essays on financial theory.

Thesis. 1978. Ph.D.--Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Alfred P. Sloan School of Management.MICROFICHE COPY AVAILABLE IN ARCHIVES AND DEWEY.Vita.Includes bibliographies.Ph.D